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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:

FEDERAL ABSTENTION AND ON-GO-

Civil Rights
Commission v. Dayton ChristianSchools, Inc., 106A S. Ct. 2718
(interim ed. 1986).

ING STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

I.

PROCEEDINGS-Ohio

INTRODUCTION

Historically, Congress has encouraged a system whereby state
courts hear cases without federal court interference. Section five of the

Anti-Injunction Act of 17931 bars federal injunctions to stay pending
state judicial proceedings unless one of three statutory exceptions is
met. In the landmark decision of Younger v. Harris,' the United States
Supreme Court created a judicial exception to the Anti-Injunction Act
allowing federal intervention when "a person about to be prosecuted in
[the] state court can show that he will, if the proceeding in the state

court is not enjoined, suffer irreparable damages."' The Court maintained, however, that as a matter of general policy, which became

known as the Younger doctrine, courts of equity should defer to state
courts when federal rights and interests can be raised in state
proceedings. 4
The Younger doctrine was invoked by the United States Supreme

Court in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc., 5 in which the Court relied on considerations of federalism and

I. Ch. 22, § 5, I Stat. 333 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982)). Section 2283
of title 28 of the United States Code states that "[a] court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. §
2283 (1982).
2. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Harris, who had been indicted for violating the California Criminal
Syndicalism Act, brought suit in the federal district court. Id. at 38-39. Claiming that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act was unconstitutional on its face, Harris sought to enjoin the
county district attorney from prosecuting him. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that
Harris could not obtain a ruling in federal court to enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution
except under extraordinary circumstances where great and immediate irreparable injury would
result from the state proceeding. Id. at 53-54.
3. Id. at 43. Special circumstances where an injunction is necessary to prevent great and
irreparable injury include threats to federally protected rights or a showing of bad faith and
harassment.
4. Id. at 44. The United States Supreme Court in Younger defined comity as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
Id.

5. 106A S. Ct. 2718, 2720 (interim ed. 1986).
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comity with respect to abstention.6 In Dayton Christian Schools, the
Supreme Court, utilizing the Younger doctrine, ruled that the federal
district court should have abstained from adjudicating an action
brought by Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. under 42 U.S.C. section
1983." The action sought to enjoin the pending administrative proceedings of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission investigating charges of sex
and employment discrimination brought against Dayton Christian
Schools. 8
In reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in Dayton Christian
Schools, this note examines the extension of the Younger doctrine to
include state administrative proceedings and discusses application of
the Younger doctrine to civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. In addition, it analyzes administrative agency actions and
application of the abstention and exhaustion doctrines in determining
whether a state or federal court has the authority for judicial review.
Finally, the note discusses the ripeness doctrine and its application to
the issues in Dayton ChristianSchools.
II.
A.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Background of the Case

In January of 1979, Linda Hoskinson, a teacher at Dayton Christian Schools, 9 informed her school principal, James Rakestraw, that
she was pregnant. 10 The principal, following the biblical chain of command,1 1 informed Claude Schindler, superintendent of Dayton Christian Schools, 2 who determined that Hoskinson should not receive a
contract for the upcoming school year.'3 Schindler's decision was based
upon the school's belief that the Bible's command that parents diligently train their children requires that a mother with preschool age
children remain at home with her children.' 4

6. Id. at 2723.
7. Id. at 2722.
8. Id. at 2720.
9. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., is a private, nonprofit corporation that provides both elementary and secondary education to students. Each year, members of the school board and educational staff subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs which are delineated in the corporation's Statement of Faith, found in the Constitution of Dayton Christian Schools. Dayton
Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1008-09 (S.D. Ohio 1984).

10. Id. at loll.
I. Id. at 1010-1I. The biblical chain of command refers to the scriptural belief that a
hierarchical authority structure must be followed. Id. It is similar to the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the legal profession.
12. Id. at 1011.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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After receiving notification of nonrenewal,' 5 Mrs. Hoskinson disobeyed the school's biblical chain of command rule by consulting an
attorney. 6 After Hoskinson's attorney sent a letter to Superintendent
Schindler,' 7 Hoskinson was informed in a meeting with Mr. Schindler
and Mr. Rakestraw on March 14, 1979, that she was immediately suspended from employment.' 8 The stated basis for the suspension was the
fact that she had pursued a civil remedy by consulting an attorney and
thus had violated the specific contractual requirement that all employees of Dayton Christian Schools follow the biblical chain of com-

mand.' 9 The following day, Hoskinson met with Dayton Christian

Schools' governing board to discuss her pregnancy.

On March 26,

1979, the board met and decided that Mrs. Hoskinson would be discharged." On the next day, Hoskinson was given her notice of termina-

tion . 2 The board reasoned that Mrs. Hoskinson had breached her contract by consulting an attorney."
On March 28, 1979, following her termination, Mrs. Hoskinson
filed a charge of discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.' 4 She asserted a sex discrimination claim, alleging that her termi-

nation was based upon her pregnancy, not upon her consultation with

15. The February 20, 1979, memorandum explained that the reason Mrs. Hoskinson's contract was not renewed was because of
concern ... that as [Mrs. Hoskinson] will be a new parent (June) [her] teaching next year
would be in contrast to the Schools' philosophy. [The School] see[s] the importance of the
mother in the home during the early years of child growth. This is a factor [the Schools'
staff] consider[s] as they interview prospective teachers. If there are pre-school age children in the home [the School] recommend[s] the mother stay there and does not accept her
application.
Id. ai 1012.
16. Id. As a contractual condition of employment, teachers for Dayton Christian Schools
must agree to follow the internal process of dispute resolution which stipulates that any grievances
must be directed to a teacher's immediate supervisor. Id. at 1011. Any unresolved grievances
move up the hierarchy with the board of directors serving as a final board of appeals. Id. By
contractual agreement, employees of Dayton Christian Schools are not to seek a remedy in civil
court. Id. at 1010-12.
17. In the letter, Mrs. Hoskinson's attorney advised Mr. Schindler that
[t]o preclude [Linda Hoskinson] from further employment on the basis of pregnancy and
child rearing constitutes violations of both state and federal discrimination laws ... should
you not extend further employment to her on the basis of her pregnancy, we will have no
alternative but to explore all state and federal administrative and court remedies.
Id. at 1012.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.at 1013.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1014. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission is a state administrative agency. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.03 (Anderson Supp. 1986).
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an attorney. 5 Pursuant to its statutory duty to act upon charges of
unlawful discriminatory practice, 6 the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
began a preliminary investigation."7 In addition, the commission contacted counsel for Dayton Christian Schools in April and May of 1979
urging that the school administration "adjust" the charges against Mrs.
Hoskinson.2 8 In January 1980, after completing its investigation, the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission notified counsel for Dayton Christian
Schools of its finding that the school or members of its administration
had probably engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices, 9 violating
section 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code.3 0 In compliance with section
4112.05(B) of the Ohio Revised Code,"' the commission sent a proposed conciliation agreement and consent order to Dayton Christian
Schools 2 and advised them that if conciliation efforts failed, formal
33
proceedings would be initiated.
On April 18, 1980, after Dayton Christian Schools rejected the
conciliation agreement and consent order, the commission filed a complaint against the school to initiate an administrative hearing based
upon the sex discrimination charges and upon the commission's investigative determination that there was probable cause to believe that Dayton Christian Schools was engaging in unlawful discriminatory practices.3 ' In May 1980, Dayton Christian Schools answered the
complaint.3 5 Subsequently, in October 1980, while the administrative
proceedings were pending, Dayton Christian Schools filed a complaint
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking a per-

25.

Id.

26. OHIO

REV. CODE ANN.

§ 4112.04(A)(6) (Anderson Supp. 1986).

27.
28.
29.

Dayton Christian Schools, 578 F. Supp. at 1014.
Id.
Id. at 1014-15.

30.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 4112.02(A) (Anderson Supp. 1986).

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, natural origin, handicap, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or
otherwise'to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.
Id.
31. Id. § 4112.05(B) ("If [the Commission] determines after such investigation that it is
probable that unlawful discriminatory practices have been or are being engaged in, it shall endeavor to eliminate such practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.").
32. The proposed conciliation agreement and consent order, which sought to obtain Dayton
Christian Schools' voluntary compliance, was aimed at eliminating the alleged unlawful discriminatory practices. It required that Dayton Christian Schools reinstate Mrs. Hoskinson and award
her back pay. Dayton Christian Schools, 578 F. Supp. at 1015.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1016.
35. Id.
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manent injunction.3
B.

Evolution in the Courts

The district court, in a lengthy opinion, explored potential first
amendment problems and legislative intent,3 7 and determined that the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission's exercise of jurisdiction over Dayton
Christian Schools did not impermissibly impinge on the schools' first
amendment rights of freedom of religion. 8 The district court qualified
its ruling stating that:
In permitting the [Ohio Civil Rights Commission] to exercise jurisdiction over the instant controversy, the Court has in no way determined
either that the full force of [the Commission's] jurisdiction under [Ohio
Revised Code] Chapter 4112 can be brought to bear on [Dayton Christian Schools] without impermissibly burdening [the schools'] first
amendment rights or, even with respect to the present controversy, that
any remedy deemed appropriate by the [Commission] should they find
[Dayton Christian Schools] liable, would necessarily present no further
first amendment problems. 9
Denying the request for a permanent injunction, the court found that
the schools' concerns about state encroachment on religious freedoms
were only possibilities and, therefore, were not ripe for adjudication.40
The court also held that the statutory provisions granting jurisdiction to
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission were not unconstitutionally overbroad or void for vagueness.41 Finally, the court held that the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction did not impermissibly impinge on Dayton
Christian Schools' free exercise rights or result in government
entanglement.4
Dayton Christian Schools appealed the district court's dismissal of
the complaint to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 43 Reversing the district court's dismissal, the court of appeals concluded that
Dayton Christian Schools' first amendment rights under the free exercise and establishment clauses would be violated if the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission were permitted to assert jurisdiction over practices

36. Id. Dayton Christian Schools asserted that its actions were based on sincerely held religious beliefs and, therefore, the first amendment prevented the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
from exercising jurisdiction. Id. at 1017-18.
37. Id. 1017-25.
38. Id. at 1041.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir.
1985).
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premised on religious beliefs."'
The decision of the court of appeals was ultimately appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, relying on the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris,held that the district
court should have abstained from adjudicating the case."'
III. BACKGROUND
A.

The Younger Doctrine and Pending State Criminal Proceedings

The Federal Anti-Injunction Act of 1793"' established a historical pre-

cedent by forbidding injunction by federal courts against state officials.
This statute was limited by Ex parte Young, "' in which the Supreme
Court held that federal petitioners are able to obtain relief from
threatened state criminal prosecutions when it is absolutely necessary
for the protection of constitutional rights.' 8 This relief can be granted,
however, only when the danger of "irreparable loss is both great and

immediate" due to "extraordinary circumstances."' The effect of the
Anti-Injunction Act was further limited by the United States Supreme
Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister.50 In Dombrowski, the Court held that

when a statute is overly broad and vague, the denial of injunctive relief
may result in the denial of effective safeguards on first amendment liberties, thereby producing a chilling effect on protected expression."
In Younger v. Harris,'2 however, the United States Supreme
Court stated that the chilling effect described in Dombrowski was not
44. id. at 961.
45. 106A S. Ct. at 2719 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
46. ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982)).
In pertinent part, the statute states: "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted [by any federal
court] to stay proceedings in any court of a state ..... Id.
47. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (a federal injunction is justified when state officers threaten or are
about to begin proceedings to enforce an unconstitutional act).
48. Id. at 166-67.
49. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926) (suit brought in federal district court
seeking to enjoin state prosecutions that interfered with the free flow of interstate commerce). In
Fenner, the Supreme Court held that the accused first had to use the state court system unless it
was plain that "adequate protection" would not be available. Id. at 244.
50. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). A civil rights organization sought injunctive and declaratory relief
to restrain state and local law enforcement authorities from prosecution under the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law. 380
U.S. at 482. The Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law in part provides: "It shall be
a felony for any person knowingly and wilfully to ... (aissist in the formation or participate in the
management or to contribute to the support of any subversive organization or foreign subversive
organization knowing said organization to be a subversive or a foreign subversive organization."
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:364(4)(West 1982). The Communist Control Law authorizes the
seizure and destruction of communist progaganda and makes it a felony to disseminate such material. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:390.2, :390.6 (West 1962).
51. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 494.
52. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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sufficient to justify federal intervention."3 The Court further stated that

"the possible unconstitutionality of a statute 'on its face' does not in
itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it"
and held that the defendant in Younger "failed to make any showing of
bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstances" that would
call for equitable relief.54 Thus, the Younger Court reverted to the original intentions of the Anti-Injunction Act. Although initially applied to
pending state criminal proceedings, the abstention doctrine was eytended to pending state civil proceedings.
B. Expansion of the Younger Doctrine to Pending State Civil
Proceedings
The Younger abstention doctrine was used exclusively within the
context of state criminal prosecutions until 1975 when the United
States Supreme Court extended the Younger doctrine to state civil proceedings in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.5 5 Premising its ruling on the need
to protect important state interests, the Supreme Court held that the
principles of Younger were applicable to state civil proceedings as well

as to criminal prosecutions. 6 In addition, the Court held that the
"Younger standards must be met to justify federal intervention in a
state judicial proceeding [in] which a losing litigant has not exhausted
his state appellate remedies." '57 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions,

in which the Court has repeatedly refused to grant injunctive relief in
the presence of a pending state suit, have strengthened the trend to-

ward enforcing the principles of federalism and comity enunciated in
53. Id. at 50. The defendant, who had been indicted for violating the California Criminal
Syndicalism Act, brought suit in federal district court to enjoin the pending state prosecution. Id.
at 38-39. Citing Dombrowski as controlling precedent, the defendant contended that the Act was
unconstitutional on its face and inhibited his free speech rights. Id. at 39. The Supreme Court
responded with a reminder that the Dombrowski decision should not be interpreted so as to alter
the settled doctrines which strictly limit the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal
proceedings. The Court explained that federal injunctive relief cannot satisfactorily eliminate the
chilling effect of a statute that does not directly abridge a constitutional liberty. Id. at 50. Nor can
the chilling effect automatically render the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 51.
54. Id. at 54. A showing of bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstance is necessary to justify equitable relief through federal intervention.
55. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). A sheriff and prosecuting attorney initiated a civil action against a
theater owner under the Ohio public nuisance statute. Id. at 595. The theater owner filed a 42
U.S.C. section 1983 action in the federal district court. Id. at 598. The owner alleged the nuisance
statute was unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable. Id. The Supreme Court held that the
Younger doctrine was applicable even though the case was a civil proceeding. Id. at 611. The
Court explained that unless federal court intervention was justified under one of the Younger
exceptions such as where the state proceeding is meant to harass or is conducted in bad faith, or is
flagrantly and patently unconstitutional, the federal court should not have entertained the action.
Id.
56. Id. at 604-05.
57. Id. at 609.
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Younger and Huffman."a However, "expressly authorized" exceptions
to the Anti-Injunction Act continue to allow federal intervention in cer-

tain situations.
C.

Civil Rights Act Cases and the Younger Doctrine

While severely limiting the federal courts' power to intervene, the
Younger decision does not completely preclude federal intervention. In
Mitchum v. Foster,6 0 decided one year after Younger, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 action comes within the "expressly authorized" exceptions
to the Anti-Injunction statute.61 The Court reasoned that "[tlhe very
purpose of [section] 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color
of state law ... "62 Further, the Court found that as an Act of Congress, section 1983 was an "expressly authorized" statutory exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act therefore, a federal equity court had the
power to grant relief in a section 1983 suit seeking to stay a state court

proceeding.63 In his concurring opinion in Mitchum, Chief Justice Bur58. See e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432-35 (1979) (the Younger doctrine applied
because of the state's important interest in the enforcement of its child-abuse statute and because
the state proceedings afforded an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims); Trainor
v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (the Younger doctrine applies when the state's interest
involves the fiscal integrity of its welfare assistance program); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
334-36 (1977) (the Court stated that federal court interference with a contempt process interferes
with legitimate state activities and can be interpreted as a negative reflection on a state court's
ability to enforce constitutional principles).
59. See supra note I and accompanying text.
60. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). The prosecuting attorney sought to close down the federal petitioner's bookstore as a public nuisance under Florida law. Id. at 227. Relying on 42 U.S.C. section
1983, the federal petitioner sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state court proceedings on the ground that the unconstitutional application of Florida law was causing him great
and irreparable harm. Id. at 227. The Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.G. section 1983 is an Act
of Congress that falls within the "expressly authorized" exceptions of the Anti-Injunction Act Id.
at 242-43.
61. Id. at 226.
62. Id. at 242. 42 U.S.C. section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
63. Mitchurn, 407 U.S. at 242-43. As explained by the Court, section 1983 was the product
of an evolutionary process beginning with the l8th century concepts of federalism. Id. Since the
purpose behind section 1983 was to protect against unconstitutional action, the Court concluded
that Congress clearly authorized federal courts to issue injunctions in section 1983 actions. Id.
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ger emphasized that:
The Court holds only that 28 U.S.C. [section] 2283, which is an absolute
bar to injunctions against state court proceedings in most suits, does not
apply to a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983 seeking an injunction of state proceedings. But, as the Court's opinion has noted, [the
holding did] nothing to 'question or qualify in any way the principles of
equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when
asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.'64
Consequently, the Court's decision clearly dictates that the Younger
doctrine should also be considered in a section 1983 action. Similarly,
the principles of equity, comity, and federalism have been extended to
state administrative agency proceedings.
D. Application of the Younger Doctrine to State Administrative
Proceedings
The United States Supreme Court has also applied the Younger
doctrine to state administrative proceedings when the federal plaintiff
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim.6 5
In Gibson v. Berryhill,66 the Supreme Court pointed out that the
Younger doctrine presupposes that a competent state tribunal exists
where issues can be raised and decided. 67
In Middlesex Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association,68 the Supreme Court reiterated that the pertinent inquiry to be
made when an injunction is sought is "whether the state proceedings
afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims." 69

64. Mitchum. 407 U.S. at 243-44 (Burger, J.,concurring)(On remand of the case to the
district court, Burger cautioned that principles of equity, comity, and federalism, as enunciated in
Younger, should properly be considered in deciding whether an injunction should be issued against
the state's nuisance abatement.).
65. See e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
66. 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (complaint filed with the Alabama Board of Optometry by the
Alabama Optometric Association charged that licensed optometrists employed by Lee Optical
Company were engaging in "unprofessional conduct" and unlawful practice).
67. Id. at 577. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the Alabama Board
of Optometry was impermissibly biased, and therefore incompetent to adjudicate the issues. Id. at
578. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion
when it issued the injunction. Id. at 579.
68. 457 U.S. 423 (1982). Since the New Jersey Constitution charges the state supreme
court with the responsibility of licensing and disciplining attorneys admitted to the New Jersey
Bar, the court has promulgated rules whereby a claim of unethical conduct by an attorney is first
considered by a local district ethics committee. Id. at 425-26. A formal hearing is held by the
Committee if a prima facie case of unethical conduct exists. Id. at 426. An attorney, after being
charged by a local ethics committee of violating certain disciplinary rules, filed suit in federal
court, contending that the disciplinary rules violated federally protected rights. Id. at 428-29.
69. Id. at 432.
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The Court stated that:
The importance of the state interest in the pending state judicial proceedings and in the federal case calls Younger abstention into play. So
long as the constitutional claims.of respondents can be determined in the
state proceedings and so long as there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate, the federal courts should abstain.7"
The continued viability of the Younger doctrine as applied to state administrative agency proceedings was demonstrated by the United
States Supreme Court 71in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton
Christian Schools, Inc.
In Dayton Christian Schools, the majority of the United States
Supreme Court, following the established trend of invoking the
Younger doctrine, held that the district court should have abstained
from adjudicating the case.7 2 The Court stated that the Younger doctrine may be applied to state administrative proceedings where imporhas a full
tant state interests are at issue, providing the federal plaintiff
7 31
and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The decision rendered by the United States Supreme Court in
4
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.,
was unexpected and left significant questions regarding freedom of religion and state encroachment unanswered. It was anticipated that the
case would be resolved on its merits. However, the Supreme Court, relying on the concepts of federalism and comity, held that the doctrine
established in Younger v. Harris71 required the district court to abstain
from adjudicating the case.7 The Court explained that the abstention
doctrine established in Younger77 properly encompassed both civil and
state administrative proceedings in which important state interests are
involved.7 8 The Court further found that there was no reason to doubt
that Dayton Christian Schools would have a full and fair opportunity
for judicial determination of its constitutional claims in the state
70. Id. at 435.
71. 106A S. Ct. 2718 (interim ed. 1986).
72. Id. at 2722.
73. Id. at 2723. See also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 423; Gibson, 411 U.S. at 564.
74. 106A S. Ct. 2718 (interim ed. 1986).
75. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
76. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 106A S. Ct. at 2722.
77. 401 U.S. at 37. See also supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
78. Ohio Civil Rights Commn, 106A S. Ct. at 2723. See e.g., Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975).
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court.79
A.

Administrative Agency Action and Judicial Review
Recognizing the need to prevent unlawful discriminatory practice,

the Ohio Legislature created the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. 0 The
administrative agency has the responsibility of formulating policies to

eliminate prohibited sex discrimination within the state.81 The Ohio
Civil Rights Commission has been statutorily vested with specific

rulemaking, investigative, and judicial authority.82 Consequently, the
Commission's activities resemble those of the courts. Because the pro-

ceedings of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission are judicial in nature,

3

federal court deference is warranted under the Younger doctrine.84
The administrative proceedings of the Commission would provide

Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., with an opportunity to litigate its constitutional claims. In addition, judicial review of the commission's final
order is available pursuant to section 4112.06 of the Ohio Revised

79. 106A S. Ct. at 2723-24.
80. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.03-.04 (Anderson Supp. 1986).
81. Id. §§ 4112.04(A)(5), .04(A)(9). Subsection (A)(5) mandates that the Ohio civil rights
commission shall "[flormulate policies to effectuate the purposes of sections 4112.01 to 4112.11 of
the Revised Code, and make recommendations to agencies and officers of the state or local subdivisions of government to effectuate such policies." Id. § 4112.04(A)(5).
Subsection (A)(9) further requires the commission to
[pirepare a comprehensive educational program, in cooperation with the department of
education, for the students of the public schools of this state and for all other residents
thereof, designed to eliminate prejudice on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, handicap, age, or ancestry in this state, to further good will among such groups, to
emphasize the origin of prejudice against such groups, its harmful effects, and its incompatability with American principles of equality and fair play.
Id. § 4112.04(A)(9).
82. See generally id. § 4112.04.
83. See id. Section 4112.04 provides in pertinent part
(A) The Ohio civil rights commission shall
(4) Adopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind rules to effectuate the provisions of section
4112.01 to 4112.08 of the Revised Code;
(6) Receive, investigate, and pass upon written charges made under oath ....
(B) The commission may:
(2) Initiate and undertake on its own motion investigations of problems of employment
discrimination;
(3) Hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, administer oaths,
take the testimony of any person under oath . ..
Id.
84. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433-34. Cf.Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984) (Younger abstention was not required when the state legislation clearly stated that the
administrative proceedings were not "judicial in nature").
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Code.85 Therefore, the state court would also be able to review any
constitutional questions on appeal.8
The primary remedy when an administrative agency oversteps its
legal bounds is judicial review.87 Since it is a function of the courts to
monitor and enforce the statutory authority granted to an administrative agency, the legality of an agency decision can be challenged in the
courts.8 8 However, before an appeal of an agency decision can be disposed of on the merits, the court must first decide whether review is
available and to what extent the court can inquire into the merits of the
challenged agency action. 89 These were the key questions before the
United States Supreme Court in Dayton Christian Schools. The answer to the question-is judicial review available?-involves a number
of "hurdles." The standards for review established in the governing legislation, the timing of the review action, and the ripeness of the challenged agency act must all be considered. 90 If a claimant is unable to
overcome any of these hurdles, judicial review is not available and the
action must be dismissed. 91
B. Judicial Review as a State or Federal Court Responsibility-The
Issue of Abstention
Historically, there has been great concern over federal courts' interference in state court functions, with its implication of disrespect for
state legislative activities.9 2 State courts can most appropriately interpret state legislative intent. Regardless of whether a legislative history
is available, state courts are more familiar with their own state laws,
are more knowledgable interpreters of statutory intent, and more capa-

85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.06(A) (Anderson 1980).
Any complainant, or respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the commission, including a refusal to issue a complaint, may obtain judicial review thereof, and the
commission may obtain an order of court for the enforcement of its final orders, in a proceeding as provided in this section. Such proceedings shall be brought in the common pleas
court of the state within any county wherein the unlawful discriminatory practice which is
the subject of the commission's order was committed or wherein any respondent required in
the order to cease and desist from an unlawful discriminatory practice or to take affirmative action resides or transacts business.
Id.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
brought
whether
91.
92.
panying

Id.
B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.1 (2d ed. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Id. Other factors that must be considered include whether the proper party plaintiff has
the action, whether the action has been brought against a proper party defendant, and
the form of review action used was proper. Id.
Id. A constitutional right for review may not be precluded.
See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977). See also supra notes 1-2 and accomtext.
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ble of inferring intent with respect to breadth of statutory application.9 3
The Younger decision, which supports outright dismissal of a federal
suit brought while a state proceeding is pending and which advocates
that both state and federal claims be presented in state court, presupposes that there exists an opportunity to raise federal issues and have
them decided on a timely basis by a competent state tribunal. 94 A federal court would trivialize the concepts of comity and federalism if it
failed to acknowledge that a competent state forum for all relevant issues has been shown to be available prior to federal court proceedings
on the merits.9 5
The administrative proceedings of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which are "judicial in nature," 9 6 warrant federal court deference.9 7 Further, in accordance with section 4112.06(A),9 8 judicial review is available to a complainant or a respondent claiming to be
aggrieved by a final order of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.9 9 In
addition, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, pursuant to section
4112.061 of the Ohio Revised Code,1"' has the right to appeal an adverse judgment on questions of law relating to the constitutionality,
construction, or interpretation of the statutes and rules and regulations
of the commission. 10 1
Dayton Christian Schools sought injunctive relief against the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission's investigation and hearings on alleged sex
discrimination charges. 102 The schools' objection to the involvement of
the Commission, based upon perceived conflicts with first amendment
religion clauses,10 3 was not sustained by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court reiterated that in a sequence of cases it has rejected
the argument that a constitutional attack on state procedures immedi-

93.

Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335-36.

94. Gibson, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
95.
96.
97.

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350 (1975).
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433-34.
98. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.06(A) (Anderson 1980).
99. See B. SCHWARTZ. supra note 87.
100. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.061 (Anderson Supp. 1986). Subsection (A) of section
4112.061 states in pertinent part:
The Ohio civil rights commission, in its discretion, may appeal from an adverse judgment rendered by a court.... The appeal by the commission shall be taken on questions of
law relating to the constitutionality, construction, or interpretation of the statutes and rules
of the commission and in matters involving the correctness of the judgment of the court of
common pleas that an order of the commission is not supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence.
Id. § 4112.061(A).

101.

See id.

102.
103.

Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 106A S. Ct. at 2720.
Dayton Christian Schools. 578 F. Supp. at 1017-18.
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ately renders such procedures void for inadequacy." 4 Since the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission was merely investigating the circumstances of
Mrs. Hoskinson's discharge and since the constitutional claims could be
raised in a state court review of the administrative proceedings, the
Supreme Court ruled that there was no violation of Dayton Christian
Schools' first amendment rights." 5 In addition, because Ohio Revised
Code section 4112.06 provides for the state court's review of the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission's final order,106 the opportunity exists for
Dayton Christian Schools to have its constitutional challenges heard at
the state level. The United States Supreme Court held that, barring a
showing of bad faith, harassment, or other exceptional circumstances,10 7 the district court in the Dayton Christian Schools case
should have abstained from interfering with the ongoing state proceedings under the Younger doctrine.
C.

The Exhaustion Doctrine

To overcome the exhaustion doctrine hurdle, Dayton Christian
Schools must show that all available applicable state administrative
remedies have been identified and exhausted.1 08 This requires not only
that all possible remedies be pursued but also that they be challenged
within the state court system.10 9 The exhaustion doctrine precludes
Dayton Christian Schools from involving the federal courts
prematurely.
1. Exhaustion-Generally
The exhaustion doctrine prevents premature judicial interference
by providing "that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remed[ies] [have]
been exhausted." 110 Courts may not presuppose an administrative decision or intervene before the agency has arrived at its final decision.'
Normally, when a state has initiated administrative proceedings, the
exhaustion doctrine requires that a federal court delay injunctive proceedings until the administrative phase of the state proceeding is com-

104. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 106A S. Ct. at 2724.
105. Id. at 2723-24.
106. OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.06(A) (Anderson 1980).
107. Younger. 401 U.S. at 54.
108. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, § 8.30.
109. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
110. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)(citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding.Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)).
111. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, § 8.30. See also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County, 106A S. Ct. 2561 (interim ed. 1986); Williamson County-Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
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pleted." 2 "[The] agency, as tribunal of first instance, should be permitted to develop the factual record upon which decisions should be
based."" 8 It is sound judicial administration for a federal court to give
the administrative agency the opportunity to exercise its discretion and
apply its expertise.""
The exhaustion issue is more like a "tug-of-war" than a hurdle
which must be overcome. On the one hand, there are a number of exceptions to the doctrine which must be considered, while on the other
hand, there are factors that weigh heavily in requiring absolute
exhaustion:" 5
Pulling away from requirement[s] of exhaustion are combinations of
such factors as irreparable injury to a party from pursuing the administrative remedy, clear absence of agency jurisdiction, clear illegality of
the agency's position, a dispositive question of law peculiarly within judicial competence, the futility of exhaustion, and expense and awkwardness of the administrative proceeding as compared with inexpensive and
efficient judicial disposition of the controversy."
On the other hand,
[plulling toward [the] requirement of exhaustion are combinations of
such factors as need for factual development, importance of reflecting
agency's expertise or policy preferences in the final result, probability
that the agency will satisfactorily resolve the controversy without judicial
review, protection of agency processes from impairment by avoidable interruption, conservation of judicial energy by avoiding piecemeal or interlocutory review, and providing the agency opportunity to correct its
11 7
own errors.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies should be the rule rather than
the exception. 1 8 For reasons of comity and federalism, similar to the
rationale for abstention," 9 courts should not intervene until the administrative agency has had a full opportunity to exhaust all possible remedies. If courts are allowed to intervene while administrative actions are
pending, the legislative intent behind establishment of such agencies
will be minimized if not completely disregarded.

112.
113.
114.

B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, § 8.30.
Id.
Id.

115.

K. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 26.1 (2d ed. 1983).

116. Id. See also Gibson, 411 U.S. at 564.
1.17. K. DAVIS. supra note 115. See also Yolo County, 106A S. Ct. at 2561; Hamilton
Bank. 105 S. Ct. at 3108.
118. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a difficult issue to decide on and one requiring
a close examination of the facts.
119. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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At the time Dayton Christian Schools sought the federal injunction, the administrative process had just begun. The Ohio Civil Rights
Commission had conducted only a preliminary investigation and notified Dayton Christian Schools of a finding of probable cause with respect to Mrs. Hoskinson's sex discrimination charge.12 When Dayton
Christian Schools failed to respond to the commission's proposed conciliation agreement and consent order, a complaint was filed and a
hearing was scheduled.1 21 As the district court pointed out, permitting
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission to exercise jurisdiction over the instant controversy would not preclude Dayton Christian Schools from
commission
once again seeking federal intervention at such time as the
21
remedy.1
a
impose
to
sought
and
rendered its judgment
At the time Dayton Christian Schools sought injunctive relief in
federal court, it was unable to make a showing of irreparable injury or
any other of the factors "pulling away" from the requirement of exhaustion. The record failed to indicate that any teachers resigned or
enrollments dropped. In addition, no authority was removed from the
school, which could continue terminating teachers who violated the biblical chain of command or who became pregnant. Furthermore, the fact
that litigation is expensive cannot be interpreted as injurious. 2 3 The
Ohio Civil Rights Commission had statutory authority to proceed with
was no showing of any illegality regarding the
the hearing and there
24
agency's position.'
On the other side of the exhaustion tug-of-war, pulling toward the
requirement of exhaustion, there was a need for additional factual development in Dayton ChristianSchools which the Commission had the
expertise to pursue. Further, there was no indication in the record that
the Commission would be unable to resolve the controversy satisfactorily, and should a controversy arise, judicial review was available. In
addition, there was no showing of good cause for the need for judicial
review interpretation of the agency's proceedings since the issue was so
25
narrowly drawn.'
There is a special exception to the exhaustion doctrine for civil rights
act cases; however, in accordance with the other exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, the Civil Rights Act exhaustion exception"2 , must be
applied with caution.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Ohio Civil Rights Commn. 106A S. Ct. at 2721.
Dayton Christian Schools, 578 F. Supp. at 1016.
Id.at 1041.
See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
Ohio Civil Rights Comm n, 106A S. Ct. at 2723-24.
578 F. Supp. at 1041.
See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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Civil Rights Cases-42 U.S.C. Section 1983

When a state initiates administrative proceedings, the exhaustion
doctrine requires that a federal court delay injunctive proceedings until
the administrative phase of the state proceeding is completed.12 7 In
McNeese v. Board of Education,28s however, the Supreme Court held
that exhaustion of administrative remedies is unnecessary when the
plaintiff in federal court alleges a meritorious cause of action under
section 1983.129 Between the years 1963 and 1981 the Court categorically stated that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not a prerequisite in a section 1983 action. 30 Today, however, the debate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies in section 1983 actions
continues.' 3 '
In a 1982 case, Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 3 2 the United
States Supreme Court confirmed that exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not required prior to bringing a section 1983 action.'
The Court relied heavily upon the legislative history of the 1871 Civil
Rights Act,' 3 ' a point strongly disputed by Justice Powell and Chief
Justice Burger.3' The dissent in Patsy agreed with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that because the exhaustion rule is based on

127. McKart, 395 U.S. at 193 (citing Myers, 303 U.S. at 50-51).
128. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
129. Id. at 674-76.
130. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63, n.10 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416
(1967).
131. See e.g.. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500 (1982). Justice Powell
and a number of courts of appeal judges support a "flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies in section 1983 actions. In his dissent in Patsy. Justice Powell includes a footnote explaining
that "in all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its no-exhaustion rule, the state
administrative remedies were sufficiently inadequate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event." Id. at 532 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Developments in the Law:
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1274 (1977)).
132. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
133. Id. at 516. A female petitioner alleged that although well qualified, she had been rejected for more than thirteen positions at Florida International University solely on the basis of
her race and sex. Id. at 498. Based on this allegation, she filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in
federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief or damages. Id. The University and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit argued that for policy reasons, administrative remedies
should be exhausted. Id. They posited that exhaustion of administrative remedies would lessen the
burden that section 1983 actions posed on the federal courts and would further goals of comity
and federalism. Id. at 499-500. The university argued and the court of appeals agreed that the
expertise of the administrative agency would enlighten the federal court's final decision. Id. at
498, 512.
134. Id. at 502-07.
135. Id. at 519-36 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell opposed the majority's reliance on
the legislative history because the primary "civil rights" relied on in the majority's argument as
being violated were those of institutionalized persons. Id. at 534.
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sound considerations, administrative remedies must be exhausted prior
to federal court intervention.1 36
It does not defeat federal court jurisdiction, it merely defers it. It permits
the States to correct violations through their own procedures, and it encourages the establishment of such procedures. It is consistent with the
principles of comity that apply whenever federal courts are asked to review state action or supersede state proceedings.'
8
Justice Powell argued that the no-exhaustion rule in Patsy"' was in9
"
consistent with the Younger abstention doctrine.
In Dayton Christian Schools, 4 ' the Court commented that its application of the Younger doctrine was fully consistent with the holding
in Patsy.1 4 1 Arguably, however, the rationale provided by the Court in
these cases conflict. In Dayton Christian Schools, the Supreme Court
did not include the exhaustion doctrine in its analysis. Instead, basing
its decision on principles of comity and federalism, the Court invoked
the Younger doctrine, holding that the district court should have abstained from adjudicating the case. 4 In contrast, the Supreme Court
in Patsy neglected the abstention argument-a crucial hurdle to surmount in determining the appropriateness of federal court intervention.
Instead, the Court in Patsy relied on a correlative legislative history
of administrative remedies was
argument,143 and ruled that exhaustion
14 4
unnecessary in section 1983 actions.
It is interesting to note that in Patsy the Supreme Court's majority opinion was delivered by Justice Marshall, who was joined by Jus1 4 5 In
tices Brennan, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor.
Dayton Christian Schools, Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of
the Court and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, concurred in the judgment but opposed the
Court's rationale that the Younger doctrine required the district court

136.
137.
138.
(1963).

Id. at 532.
Id. at 532-33. See also Younger, 401 U.S. at 37.
Patsy, 457 U.S. at 533. See also McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668

139. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 533-34.
140. 106A S. Ct. at 2718 (interim ed. 1986).
141. Id. at 2722.
142. Id.
143. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 502-07.
144. Id. at 500-01.
145. Id. at 497. Justice White joined the holding but disagreed with the discussion regarding Congress' intent to carve out an exception to the no-exhaustion rule with respect to section
1983 actions outlined by the majority in id. at 507-12. Id. at 517-19 (White, J., concurring).
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to dismiss the Ohio Civil Rights Commission's complaint. " 6 Instead,
the concurrence concluded that Dayton Christian Schools' constitutional challenge was not ripe for review,1 7 hence the district court
should have abstained from involvement.
D. Ripeness
Whether a claim is ripe for review is yet another hurdle that must
be surmounted before judicial review of an administrative agency act
becomes available.1 8 The ripeness doctrine relates to the "case and
controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. 4 9 It is an element of a court's discretion designed to prevent premature adjudication which could potentially result in courts becoming
webbed in abstract administrative policy arguments.'
The ripeness
doctrine has evolved to protect an administrative agency from judicial
interference until the agency has had an opportunity to formalize a
decision and the effects of that decision have been felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties.' 5' In this respect, it is clear that although the ripeness and exhaustion doctrines are not interchangeable,
they are interrelated. While exhaustion of administrative remedies is
sometimes a requirement which must be met prior to adjudicating a
suit in federal court, ripeness deals more conceptually with whether a
claim is even justiciable.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,52 the United States Supreme
Court identified two factors essential to a ripeness determination: first,
the issues must be fit for judicial resolution, and second, there must be
an imminent adverse effect to the parties if court consideration is withheld. " If the injury is only imaginary or speculative, it cannot be said
to be ripe for adjudication. 54 The requisite injury must be in sharp
enough focus and the adverseness of the parties concrete enough to allow a court to decide a real rather than a hypothetical situation.'
If
the injury is to occur in the future, it must be "reasonably certain and
clearly describable" in order for adjudication to proceed. 3 6 In addition

146. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 106A S. Ct. at 2724 (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2725.
148. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, § 9.1.
149. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
150. Id. at 148-149.
151. Id.
152. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
153. Id. at 149.
154. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-60 (1973).
155. Martin Tractor Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 627 F.2d 375, 379 (1980).
156. Id.
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to the two factors identified in Abbott, 6 7 the extent of the "chill" a
statute may impose on first amendment rights has been considered significant in determining whether an otherwise unripe claim is in fact
ripe for adjudication. 15 8 Finally, a claim "is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a
final decision regarding the application of the regulations . . . at
issue." 16 9
In the Supreme Court's decision in Dayton ChristianSchools, the
majority stated that the case was ripe for adjudication because a reasonable threat existed that the Ohio Civil Rights Commission would
impose sanctions.16 0 The concurrence, however, did not feel that Dayton Christian Schools' constitutional challenge was ripe for review.'"
Instead, Justice Stevens reasoned that
it does not follow that a challenge to whatever remedy might ultimately
be fashioned (should liability be established and relief ordered) is ripe
merely upon a showing of a "reasonable threat" that proceedings will
commence.... In view of the absence of any finding of liability in this
case, and the Commission's demonstrated willingness to tailor remedies
to accommodate the exercise of religious freedoms, there is plainly no
"reasonable threat" that an overly intrusive remedy will trench on [the
Schools'] First Amendment rights. 6 '
The concurrence was undoubtedly correct in holding that the controversy in Dayton ChristianSchools was not ripe for federal adjudication. Since the administrative process was not yet complete at the time
Dayton Christian Schools sought an injunction in the district court, and
since there was no evidence of an imminent adverse effect, it was only
speculative as to whether a harm would occur, especially since the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission was willing to tailor remedies to accommodate religious freedoms.' 63 Neither was there any proof that any hardship would be placed upon Dayton Christian Schools by allowing the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission to formalize a decision prior to federal
court intervention. Even if there was a possibility of imminent adverse
not be ripe if additional administrative remedies
effect, the claim would
64
exhausted.1
be
could
By stating that the case was ripe, the majority in Dayton Christian

157. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
158. Martin Tractor, 627 F.2d at 380.
159. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3117.
160. 106A S. Ct. at 2722 n.I.
161. Id. at 2726 n.4 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, § 9.1.
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Schools vitiated the judicial policy that federal courts should allow
state courts to oversee their own state government including statutorily
directed administrative agencies. The Court "jumped the gun" in arriving at the ripeness conclusion-an unwise step in judicial
administration.
E. Significance of Dayton Christian Schools
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court's decision in Dayton Christian Schools will have significant precedential value. Since the five justices in the majority relied exclusively on the Younger abstention doctrine 6 5 and the four concurring justices relied exclusively on lack of
ripeness and argued against abstention, 6 6 there is little consistency in
the Court's methodology. Consequently, the United States Supreme
Court's decision does not provide a basis for predictability in determining questions of judicial review of an administrative agency decision. In
determining whether judicial review is available, a number of factors
including abstention, exhaustion, and ripeness must be considered.
However, Dayton Christian Schools provides no guide for predicting
which of these hurdles will be considered surmounted or which will
serve as stumbling blocks in an appeal for judicial review. It appears
that judicial review questions will continue to be decided on a case by
case basis with only general determinative factors available to forecast
whether review will occur.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton ChristianSchools, 167
the United States Supreme Court, relying on concepts of federalism
and comity, correctly held that the federal district court should have
abstained from adjudicating the case and allowed the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission to complete its procedural process.16 8 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that federal court deference is warranted when the litigants have a full and fair opportunity to raise constitutional claims in the state court. 169
Although there was a five to four split among the Supreme Court
justices regarding the specific reasons for denying judicial review, 70 all
members of the Court agreed that federal court intervention was inappropriate. Basing its decision on the Younger abstention doctrine, the

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

106A
Id. at
106A
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

S. Ct. at 2720.
2726 n.4.
S. Ct. 2718 (1986).
2722-23..
2723.
2724-25.
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majority found that because the opportunity existed for Dayton Christian Schools to have its constitutional challenges heard at the state
level 171 and because no showing of bad faith, harassment, or other exceptional circumstances could be made, the federal court should have
abstained from interfering in the on-going state proceedings. 7 2
Based on the interrelated doctrines of exhaustion and ripeness (the
latter relied upon by the four-member concurrence), federal court interference was premature. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission did not
have an opportunity to reach a final decision because the hearing regarding Mrs. Hoskinson's discrimination charges had not yet begun.1" 3
Consequently, the commission did not have the opportunity to exercise
its discretion and apply its expertise. In addition, the commission did
not even begin to exhaust all possible administrative remedies as is required prior to federal court intervention.
Although the majority of the Court held the case was ripe for review because a reasonable threat existed that the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission would impose sanctions, 74 the concurrence insisted that
ripeness could not be assumed based on a showing of a reasonable
threat to "whatever" remedy might be decided upon."' Since there was
no evidence of an imminent adverse effect and since it was only speculative that a harm would exist, the majority's determination of ripeness
appears illogical and incorrect.
Federal judicial review is available only after a claimant successfully surmounts the abstention, exhaustion, and ripeness hurdles. Consequently, although many people anticipated resolution of Dayton
Christian Schools' first amendment issues on the merits, the United
States Supreme Court properly held that the federal court system became involved prematurely. Despite the disagreement between the rationales of the majority and the concurrence, the case serves as a reminder that the United States Supreme Court is united in its respect
for state court contributions to the much larger governmental and judicial networks.
Donna K. LeClair

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.. at 2723-24.
Id.
Id.
106A S. Ct. at 2722 n.l.
Id. at 2726 n.4.
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